Australia needs to invest in learning how China thinks
This is an opinion-piece that was published in th Canberra Times on July 21, 2008.
Economic forecasts about China, such as those by Goldman Sachs reported last week, illustrate what Australian public policy advisers and political leaders already know. From resource and land-rich Africa through the oil states of the Persian Gulf to the growing economies in Asia and across the anxious belts of industry in western Europe and the United States, it is clear that China has the weight and ability if not the express intent to reshape global relationships.
There has never been such a rapid rise in international importance by a single country.
For most within the Australian Government, the scale of China, its multitudinous levels and agencies of government, the breadth and depth of the concept of the state and the perplexing blends of state interest and private interest leave a fractured but undifferentiated picture of Chinese administration, its strategic assessments and its pursuit of China's "national interests".
As the London Independent stated last week, China will not only cause shifts in economic and political power and influence, these changes will force Western policymakers to come to terms with Chinese cultures of management in order to deal with and adapt to Chinese activities. This means our composite view of Chinese policy and administration requires, in a term used by many officials, more granularity.
Canberra has struggled in a limited way with this shift already. China remains only for a short time an issue for specialists and aficionados. Cabinet-level worries about Chinese investment strategy and the possible political intent behind purchases of our resource firms dominated foreign investment media early this year. They continued to do so only last week. China's natural interest in controlling its resource supply and prices forced Canberra to signal that political concerns over Beijing's ambitions can upset relations to the chagrin of eager Australians and others wanting to offload the country's resources.
So far the detail of this debate has been for China experts. They have learned through frontline experience about China's understanding of its national interest, public policy and its implementation. Unlike our relations with the UK and US and to a lesser degree with Japan, South Korea and Indonesia, China for most officials remains an enigma momentarily manageable, albeit through generalised understanding and analysis.
Usually our cadre of specialists on particular countries or regions has increased as the importance of those places increased. It was a gradual process. This is not so for China.
Very few policymakers know the cultures of China's decision-making structures. That's why there remains in Canberra an informal ''China School'' of those who say they do. That's why, as our relationships with the UK and US are more extensive, experienced and grounded, we do not have similar vernacular to describe a small coterie of specialists for these relationships.
From now on, dealing with China will be largely ideas-based rather than dollar-driven, involving a transition from bargaining based on calculable negotiations to political transactions flowing from a better understanding of the Chinese method.
Today's hot spots with China are over energy and other resources, and in five years they still will be. But our dialogue will have grown extensively. Manufacturing policy, labour issues and human rights, agricultural exports and land ownership, tariffs, anti-competitive dumping, product standards, visas and tourism, even cultural expression and artistic exchange will become interfaces for Australian officials with China. The signs are already evident. Beijing has intervened in debate about Sydney crime, visibly (and demonstrably so) in the Canberra leg of the Olympic Torch Relay, art censorship and issues of export quality of its food and manufactured goods. Australia's bureaucracy is being touched in more and more places by its relationship with China.
While we may not understand China well, China understands us. Overseas Chinese living here have embraced China and have given it a deep knowledge of Australia and the West. If we don't understand China, we're already at a great disadvantage.
This means a larger group of Australian officials needs to be au fait with Chinese approaches to policy planning and execution.
The United States sees reason to approach China in an informed manner. James Shinn, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said at his Senate confirmation in December 2007, "The US Department of Defence has a fairly sophisticated understanding of China's capabilities, but we lack insight into China's intent because China's build-up is occurring in the absence of transparency. Without greater transparency, the United States and othernations cannot fully determine the degree and type of risk that China's build-up poses."
For China to be a field of expertise in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and in some sections of the Departments of Agriculture or Resources and the Treasury is not a workable model for the future. Knowing how China thinks deserves broader application. We can start this now.
While defence concerns are an issue here, our size, location and overall asymmetry with China invite a Public Service-wide and structured exposure to Chinese policy practices, personal liaison between counterpart officials and an understanding of Chinese concepts and features in policymaking. Australia does this across departments with our allies instinctively for example, through information-gathering visits and conferencing, and through talks such as the American Australian Leadership Dialogue. China invests here across the board. We need to consider the need for our own systematic public-sector investment in knowing the Chinese method so as to deal with Beijing as reasonably, knowledgeably and effectively as possible.
Philip Eliason is director of a Canberra public policy consultancy which specialises in international trade and economic matters.
